Logical Forms Depend on Semantic Models: the Illusory Disjunctive Sentences as Pieces of Evidence

Abstract

The theory of mental models is able to explain a broad spectrum of facts related to cognition. However, it can be thought that the problem with this theory from the linguistic point of view is that it ignores logical form and hence syntax. It has been proposed that there are ways to link the theory of mental models to formal structures. However, a problem remains in proposals of that kind: the detection of logical forms always seems to depend on iconic possibilities such as those raised by the aforementioned theory, which in turn appears to mean that this last framework refers to really basic aspects of cognition and language. This paper tries to show that all of this is correct by resorting to an example that does not seem to have been studied in depth from this perspective: the case of the illusory disjunctive sentences, that is, disjunctive sentences people tend to consider to be true and which are not actually.